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Abstract
This paper considers the problem of dividing agents among
coalitions. We concentrate on Additively Separable He-
donic Games (ASHG’s), in which each agent has a non-
negative value for every other agent and her utility is the
sum of the values she assigns to the members of her coali-
tion. Unlike previous work, we analyze a model where
exactly k coalitions must be formed, and the goal is to
maximize the utility of the agent which is worst o, i.e.,
the egalitarian social welfare. We show that this problem
is hard, even when the number of agents should be equally
divided among the coalitions. We thus propose a heuristic
that maximizes the egalitarian social welfare and maxi-
mizes the average utility of each agent as a secondary goal.
Using extensive simulations, both on synthetic and real
data, we demonstrate the eectiveness of our approach.
Specically, our heuristic provides solutions that are much
fairer than the solutions that maximize the average so-
cial welfare, while still providing a relatively high average
social welfare.
1 Introduction
Coalition formation is one of the fundamental research
problems in multi-agent systems [12]. Broadly speaking,
coalition formation is concerned with partitioning a pop-
ulation of agents into disjoint teams (or coalitions) with
the aim that some system-wide performance measure is
maximized or that the selected partition is stable according
to some stability measure.
One of the main classes of coalition formation games is
Hedonic Games [4, 10]. In these games, each agent’s utility
solely depends on the other agents within her coalition
and not on how other agents are partitioned. There is
an important subclass of Hedonic Games, which is called
Additively Separable Hedonic Games (ASHG’s) [2, 3]. In
these games each agent has a value for each of the other
agents, and her utility in a given coalition formation is
the sum of the values she assigns to the members of her
coalition. For example, consider the problem of dividing
students into classes. In this case each student may specify
her friends, and her utility is the number of friends she
has within the class to which she is assigned. Another
example is of assigning agents to complete tasks. Each
agent can specify how well she works with other agents,
and her utility is the sum of the values she specied to the
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members of her coalition.
The usual objective in ASHG’s is to maximize the sum of
individual utilities of the agents, i.e., the utilitarian social
welfare. In addition, one assumption made in most coali-
tion formation games is that any number of coalitions can
be formed. However, it is sometimes more important to
maximize the utility of the agent that is worst o, i.e. the
egalitarian social welfare, and in many real-world prob-
lems exactly k coalitions are required. For example, when
dividing students into classes there is a known number of
classes that have to be formed, and this number cannot
be modied. There is no way to form more or less classes
than agreed upon by the school and the administration.
Moreover, a partition which yields an average of 3 friends
per student but leaves a couple with no friends at all would
be considered by many to be worse than a partition with
an average of 2.5 friends per student in which everyone
has at least one friend.
In this paper we study ASHG’s with non-negative utilities,
where the objective is to maximize the egalitarian social
welfare while exactly k coalitions are allowed to be formed.
We rst show that maximizing the egalitarian social welfare
is hard even for xed k and equally sized coalitions. How-
ever, for simple games (see the denition below), nding
a coalition structure with an egalitarian value of 1 can be
done in polynomial time, if one exists. Similarly, we show
that nding a coalition structure with egalitarian value
of 2 can be done in polynomial time, if the game is also
symmetric and has a specic structure. Unfortunately, we
show that when maximizing the egalitarian social welfare
the loss in the utilitarian social welfare is unbounded.
As noted before, our problem is well-motivated by real
world scenarios. We thus propose a simulated annealing
heuristic that maximizes the egalitarian social welfare. We
also propose a variant of hill climbing, denoted LexiClimb,
which maximizes the the egalitarian social welfare and the
average utility of each agent as a secondary goal. For eval-
uating the heuristics we used real preferences of students
from 3 schools as well as synthetic data, and our extensive
simulations demonstrated the eectiveness of LexiClimb.
Specically, LexiClimb provides solutions that are much
fairer than the solutions that maximize the average social
welfare, while still providing a relatively high average so-
cial welfare.
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2 Related Work
There are few works that consider the objective of maxi-
mizing the egalitarian social welfare of a coalition structure.
Skibski et al. [15] propose to study the egalitarian social
welfare in general non-transferable utility games. In the
domain of ASHG’s, Peters [13] showed that nding a max-
imum egalitarian partition is polynomial time tractable, if
the game is symmetric and its graphical representation is
of bounded tree width. Aziz et al. [3] considered arbitrary
utilities, and showed that nding a maximum egalitarian
partition is NP-hard, and verifying the existence of such
partition is coNP-complete. All of these works assume that
every coalition structure is feasible, while we assume that
exactly k coalitions are allowed to be formed.
The restriction on the number of coalitions has been mostly
overlooked. Indeed, Skibski et al. [15] study k-coalitional
cooperative games under the transferable utility setting,
and develop a dedicated extension of the Shapley value for
this game. Sless et al. [16, 17] initiated the study of ASHG’s
where exactly k coalitions must be formed. However, their
goal is to to maximize the utilitarian social welfare.
When looking at the decision problem, whether a coalition
formation of egalitarian value of at least m exists, there
are some tractable instances or guaranteeing constraints.
For every ASHG there is an equivalent representation as a
weighted graph, and nding a coalition structure is there-
fore equivalent to nding partition of the graph. Hence, a
notable result by Stiebitz [18] shows that every simple sym-
metric ASHG can be partitioned to a high egalitarian value
coalition structure if the original minimum degree of its
graphical representation is high enough. However, this re-
sult is not applicable for ASHG’s which are not symmetric
[1]. Bang et al. [5] proved that in the general case decid-
ing whether a simple symmetric ASHG has a 2-coalitions
coalition structure with egalitarian values of at least (δ1,δ2)
is generally hard, except for some special cases regarding
(δ1,δ2) and the graphical representation’s minimum degree.
For asymmetric case the same problem was proved to be
polynomial-time solvable by [7] for the case of δ1 = δ2 = 1
and was proven to be NP-hard recently by [6]for any higher
values.
We later focus on heuristics aiming at maximizing the egal-
itarian social welfare of a k-coalitions coalition structure
of an ASHG, while constraining the sizes of each coalition,
as well as maximizing the utilitarian social welfare as a
secondary goal. The problem of maximum utilitarian parti-
tion of roughly equally sized partitions is a known problem
called Graph Partitioning [11] and is proven to be NP-hard,
while having very good practical algorithms.
Another related problem with a similar goal is the Satis-
factory Partition Problem [14]. In this problem the goal is
to nd a 2-partition of a graph where each vertex has at
least as many neighbours in his subgraph as in the other
subgraph. A generalization of this problem for k-partitions
was introduced by [8], where they proved hardness for the
dierent variations of the problem.
3 Preliminary Denitions
A hedonic coalition formation game is given by a tuple
(N , ) where N = {1, . . .n} is a nite, non-empty set of
players and = (1, . . . , n) is a preference prole, speci-
fying for each player i ∈ N his relation i over the set
Ni = {C ⊆ N |i ∈ C}. We say that player i prefers
(strictly prefers) coalition C over coalition C ′ if it holds
that C i C ′ (C i C ′). A solution for a hedonic game is a
partition pi of N , also called a coalition structure (CS). We
will use the notion pi (i) to denote the coalition in pi that
includes player i , and P to refer to all possible partitions.
K-coalitional games are games where exactly K coalitions
must be formed.
An additively separable hedonic game (ASHG), (N , ), is
a hedonic game where each player i has a value vi (j) for
each other player j being in the same coalition as hers, and
the utility of agent i being in a coalition C ∈ Ni is the sum
vC (i) = ∑j ∈S\{i } vi (j). We say an ASHG is simple if for any
two players i, j it holds thatvi (j) ∈ {0, 1}, and is symmetric
if vi (j) = vj (i).
The utilitarian social welfare of a partition pi is dened as
the sum of individual utilities of all of the agents. In this
paper we will often use the average utility of all players
as an indicator for the utilitarian social welfare as they
are linearly correlated, and in our work we want to put
the perspective on the individual. The egalitarian social
welfare of a partition is given by the utility of the agent
that is worst o. Formally we have:
U (pi ) =
∑
i ∈N
vpi (i)/n
E(pi ) = min{vpi (i)|i ∈ N }
A maximum egalitarian coalition structure is a coalition
structure that maximizes the egalitarian social welfare com-
pared to all other possible coalition structures. Formally:
argmax
pi ∈P
E(pi )
The maximum egalitarian k-coalition CS is dened simi-
larly, as a CS that maximizes the egalitarian social welfare
among all other k-coalition CS’s.
We dene the maximum utilitarian (k-coalition) coalition
structure the same way except with the utilitarian social
welfare.
A (m1,m2, . . . ,mk )-partition is a k-partition where each
coalition C1,C2, . . . ,Ck is at least of size m1,m2, . . . ,mk
respectively. An equal sized k-partition is a partition into k
coalitions where each is of size n/k . We will look at a case
where roughly equally sized coalitions are required, and
for that we use the same denition from Graph Partition:
A (k, 1 + ϵ)-partition is a partition into k coalitions where
each coalition is at maximum of size (n/k) ∗ (1 + e).
The main problem we discuss in the paper is nding the
coalition structure that maximizes the egalitarian value.
Formally we dene the decision problem as follows:
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Denition 1. DecisionEgalitarianCS: Given an addi-
tively separable hedonic game G = (N , ), and positive
integers k,δ . Decide whether there exists a k-CS of G of
egalitarian value of at least δ .
The equal variation DecisionEgalitarianEqalCS is the
same problem, but with the restriction that we look only
for equal sized k coalition structures.
ASHGs can be represented as graphs, hence we use notions
of graphs in this paper in many cases instead of those of
game theory; Vertices and edges represent the players and
their utility functions respectively. A k-coalition structure
is equivalent to a k-cut, and the total weight and the mini-
mum weight are the same as the utilitarian social welfare
and the egalitarian social welfare, respectively. For the
minimum out-weight of a digraph D = (V ,E) we will use
the notion δ (D) and the total weight is simply |E |. In the
case of simple ASHGs we can use the degrees instead of the
weights, and in the case of symmetric ASHGs an undirected
graph instead of a graph. Most of the other denitions also
follow through very clearly.
In this paper we will talk only on digraphs, unless speci-
cally stated otherwise.
4 Theoretical remarks and observations
4.1 Equally Sized Coalitions
Bang et al [6] proved that DecisionEgalitarianCS δ ≥ 2.
We prove that the equal sized version of the problem is also
hard:
Theorem 1. DecisionEgalitarianEqalCS is NP-
complete.
Proof. We use a reduction from the general case. We show
that if there is a polynomial-time algorithm A′ that solves
DecisionEgalitarianEqalCS, there is also a polynomial-
time algorithm A that solves DecisionEgalitarianCS.
Let us assume there exists such an algorithm A′ . LetG be a
simple ASHG with n players and let G,k,δ be an input for
a DecisionEgalitarianCS problem. We use the following
algorithm A to solve it:
1. Create a gameG′ which isG with n(k−1) new players,
each of which has all original players as neighbours.
2. Run A on G′,k,δ , and returns the answer of A.
First let’s assume that A returns yes on G′,k,δ . Since all
new players’ utilities are from the original players, origi-
nal players must be partitioned among all the coalitions in
the coalition structure of A. We can take the same coali-
tion structure, remove all new players and get a coalition
structure of exactly k coalitions. Also, the original players’
utilities haven’t changed, so by removing the new players
we haven’t changed their utilities. Hence the egalitarian
value is still at least δ . Secondly, let’s assume that there is
a k - coalition structure in the original game of egalitarian
value of at least δ , then A returns yes. We can simply add
players to any of the current coalitions, up to n players in
each coalition. The new coalition structure is obviously
of exactly k equally sized coalitions. If we run this algo-
rithm we get the maximum egalitarian 2-CS: Let’s suppose
the maximum egalitarian value possible is m and that A′
returns m′ . Note that m cannot be bigger than n/2 as at
least 1 of the coalitions is at most of size n/2. We can take
a 2-partition with an egalitarian value m and add n − 2
players in such a way as to obtain 2 equally sized coalitions
of n − 1 players each. Since the new n − 2 players have
everyone as friends they each have a utility of n − 2, and
the egalitarian value staysm. Now suppose A′ returnsm′ ,
then we can take away the n − 2 new players and still have
m
′ as an egalitarian value. This is true because, just like for
m, there is a coalition inG′ with at most n/2 fromG , hence
there is a player with a utility of at most n/2 − 1, which is
smaller than n − 2. So we getm ≥ m′ , and with the result
from abovem =m′ . 
4.2 Egalitarian Value of at Least 1
In 2016 [7] proved that checking whether a digraph has a
partition into 2 subgraphs of sizes at least (m1,m2) such
that each of them has an out-degree of least 1 can be
done in polynomial time if (m1,m2) are xed. We prove
that the same can be done for a k-partition of xed sizes
m1,m2, . . . ,mk for a xed k .
Theorem 2. Let D be a subdigraph, k > 2, and let
(m1,m2, . . . ,mk ) be positive integers. Deciding whether D
has a (m1,m2, . . . ,mk )-partition with out-degree of at least
1 is polynomial-time solvable for a xed k .
Proof. We show an inductive algorithm which solves this
problem that runs in polynomial time. For the case of k = 2
we use the fact that a graph satises the requirement if and
only if one of the follow holds [7]:
1. D has two disjoint directed cyclesC1 andC2 of length
at leastm1 andm2 respectively.
2. D has a subdigraph D′1 such that δ (D
′
1) ≥ 1, m1 ≤
|D′1 | ≤ 2m1 − 2, and D − D
′
1 has a directed cycle of
length at leastm2.
3. D has a subdigraph D′2 such that δ (D
′
2) ≥ 1, m2 ≤
|D′2 | ≤ 2m2 − 2, and D − D
′
2 has a directed cycle of
length at leastm1.
4. D has two disjoint subdigraphs D′1,D
′
2 such that
δ (D′i ) ≥ 1, mi ≤ |D
′
i | ≤ 2mi − 2 for i = 1, 2.
Each of the above can be checked in polynomial time. In
short, (1) is true because checking if a disjoint union of
directed cycles are a subdigraph of a given digraph can be
done in polynomial time as it is a planar graph with no
in-degree or out-degree of 2 or more. (2) is true because
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checking whether a digraph S of a xed size has an out-
degree at least 1 can be done in constant time, there are
polynomial possible sets of sizem1, and checking the exis-
tence of a directed cycle in D−S can be done in polynomial
time as mentioned above. (3) and (4) follow simply from
the reasons described about (2).
We prove k > 2 with induction. Assume that the algorithm
works in polynomial time for every 2 ≤ k ′ < k , then a
subdigraph D has a (m1,m2, . . . ,mk )-partition if and only
if:
1. D has k disjoint cycles C1,C2, . . . ,Ck each of size at
leastm1,m2, . . . ,mk respectively.
2. D has a subdigraph D′i such that δ (D
′
i ) ≥
1, mi ≤ |D′i | ≤ 2mi − 2, and D − D
′
i has a(m1,m2, . . . ,mi−1,mi+1, . . . ,mk )-partition with out-
degree of at least 1 for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Both statements can be checked in polynomial time: (1) For
each combination ofm′1,m
′
2, . . . ,m
′
k such thatmi ≤ m
′
i ≤ n
and
∑k
i=1m
′
i ≤ n, we check if the union of k disjoint cycles
C1,C2, . . . ,Ck of sizes m
′
1,m
′
2, . . . ,m
′
k is a subdigraph of
D. There are less than nk possibilities form′1,m
′
2, . . . ,m
′
k ,
and for each of these possibilities the check can be done
in polynomial time as stated above. (2) follows the same
statements from the 2-partition case. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ n
there is a polynomial number of subdigraphs of sizemi ≤
|D′i | ≤ 2mi − 2. For each subdigraph D
′
i , checking if δ (D
′
i )
can be done in a xed time, and checking if (D − D′i ) has(m1,m2, . . . ,mi−1,mi+1, . . . ,mk )-partition with out-degree
of at least 1 is done in polynomial time by the induction
assumption. 
4.3 Egalitarian value of 2 in Symmetric Games
We take a small break to talk about symmetric games and
their matching representation - undirected graphs - in this
section, as there are not many results on this subject. For
undirected graphs of minimum degree at least k + 1 we can
check in polynomial time whether it has a k-partition of
minimum degree at least 2 or not as follows: First, check if
the graph contains k vertex-disjoint cycles, which can be
done in polynomial time [9]. If not, then the answer to the
problem is also no, as every graph of minimum degree 2
has a cycle in it, and a k-partition of minimum degree at
least 2 guarantees at least k disjoint cycles. If the graph has
k disjoint cycles, the answer to the problem is also yes. We
start by partitioning the graphs into the k disjoint cycles
and an ‘leftovers‘. Any vertex which is not in one of the
cycles is added to any one of them which contains at least
2 of its neighbours, arbitrarily. If after this process there
are still some nodes left outside, it holds that each one of
them either has at least 2 neighbours among them or 1
neighbour in each part, as well as the ‘leftovers‘. In that
case we take all of the ‘leftovers‘ and add them to one of the
parts arbitrarily, as in the union each one of the ‘leftovers‘
is guaranteed to have at least 2 neighbours.
4.4 No bound available
We would like to bound the utilitarian social welfare of the
maximum egalitarian social welfare k-CS to the maximum
utilitarian social welfare possible. We show that this is not
possible with an example of the worst case ratio. Optimally,
the best utilitarian social welfare possible is |E |. It is clear
that if we can obtain ak-CS with egalitarian value of at least
1, then the lower bound of the utilitarian social welfare is
n, and if we cannot there is no reason to compare the two.
We present an example where there is a k-cut with mini-
mum degree 1 and total degree of exactly n, whereas the
maximum total degree possible approaches |E | the larger
the graph: Let n be an integer divisible by k , and denote
n/k asm. Let D be a digraph with n vertices numbered a1
to an , where every vertex has k out-edges pointing at the k
next vertices (i.e. vertex a1 pointing at a2 to ak+1 and vertex
an pointing at a1 to ak ). It is possible to obtain minimum
degree 1 by simply dividing the digraph into k disjoint cy-
cles Vi = {ai ,ai+k ,ai+2k , . . . ,ai+m∗k }, i ∈ {1, . . . ,k}. We
prove that this is the only k-cut that provides a minimum
out-degree 1.
Proposition 1. Any subgraph in the above settings with
minimum degree of at least 1 is of size at leastm.
Proof. For the proof we will use the fact that every digraph
with a minimum out-degree of at least 1 has a cycle in it. Let
D
′ be a subgraph with less than m vertices. For aesthetic
reasons we assume a1 is in D
′ . In order to close a cycle, a
vertex in the k prior vertices to a1 must be in the subgraph
as well, i.e. one of an−k+1,an−k+2, . . . ,an . Let us assume by
contradiction that D′ has a minimum degree of at least 1.
Every vertex can reach the next k vertices. Since we have
at mostm−1 vertices, andm−2 vertices other than the last
vertex, we can reach at most (m−2)∗k = n−2k vertices after
a1. Hence the last vertex we can reach is an−2k+1, which
is too far from a1 to close a cycle. Since every subgraph is
of a size at least m it holds that all subgraphs are of size
exactlym. 
Now we assume by contradiction that there are 2 vertices
in the subgraph with a dierence smaller than k . We follow
the same arguments from the proof above, but now we
have m vertices. We know that 2 vertices are closer than
k , so we gain the highest index from above plus less than
k . At most this is 1 + n − 2k + (k − 1) = n − k which is still
too far from a1.
For a min k-cut we partition the graph into m adjacent
vertices: Vi = {ai∗k+1,ai∗k+2, . . . ,ai∗k+m}. In this cut every
subgraph hasm − k vertices with all of their edges in the
subgraph, and the last vertices have k −1,k −2, . . . , 1, 0. So
we have a total degree of k ∗ [(m −k)k + (k − 1) ∗k/2. Even
if we take out the (k − 1) ∗k/2 part, we get to k ∗ (n −k2) =
n ∗ k − k3. For every ϵ > 0 there is no guarantee that
n ∗ k − k3 < k ∗ (1 + ϵ).
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5 Heuristics and Experiments
5.1 Algorithms
Algorithm 1 Simulated Annealing(CS)
1: BestCS← CS,BestUtil← util(CS)
2: while step < stepsLimist do
3: SwapOrMove = Random({Move,Swap})
4: if SwapOrMove is Move then
5: C1← Random(CS) s.t. C1>MinSize
6: C2← Random(CS) s.t. C2<MaxSize
7: a ← Random(C1)
8: C1← C1 \ {a},C2← C2 ∪ {a}
9: else if SwapOrMove is Swap then
10: C1, C2← Random(CS)
11: a ← Random(C1),b ← Random(C2)
12: C1← C1 \ {a} ∪ {b},C2← C2 \ {b} ∪ {a}
13: end if
14: CurrUtil← util(CS)
15: if Accept(BestU til ,CurrU til , temp) > Rand(0, 1)
then
16: BestCS← CS
17: else
18: Revert(CS)
19: end if
20: end while
21: return bestCS
For practical results, we show an algorithm that aims at
maximizing the egalitarian social welfare while maintain-
ing the utilitarian social welfare as high as possible. For the
calculation of the optimal utilitarian value we use KaHIP,
a graph partition solver, as it is considered one of the best
current solvers [11]. We started by using a simulated an-
nealing algorithm to try and maximize the egalitarian value.
We used the utility function of n ∗ δ − nδ where n is the
number of vertices, δ the current minimum out-degree
and nδ is the number of vertices of out-degree δ , the tem-
perature 0.8step/steplimit and the acceptance probabil-
ity being e(curr_util−old_util )/temp . The utility function en-
sures that a partition with a high minimum out-degree
will have a higher value than one with a lower minimum
out-degree, and also tries to minimize the number of ver-
tices of the current minimum out-degree. In order to im-
prove the results obtained by the simulated annealing, we
used the concept of leximin. It means that we try to min-
imize the number of people in the worst situation, then
go to the next level and try to minimize that as well. For-
mally leximin is a lexicon order that works as follows: we
say (a1,a2, . . . ,an) >leximin (b1,b2, . . . ,bn) ⇐⇒ ai <
bi f or the f irst i where ai , bi . In our case it serves our
purpose to take care of the worst students rst. We com-
pare two partitions by the leximin order of their list of
out-degrees. The algorithm starts with a given partition
and moves vertices between the subgraphs each iteration
by local improvements: Look at two random coalitions
and move the vertex which improves the leximin order the
most. After we nd no improvement for several iterations
in a row we stop and start from another coalition struc-
ture. After a number of iterations decided preemptively,
the algorithm outputs the best partition found.
Algorithm 2 Leximin(CS)
1: BestCS← CS
2: NoImprovementCounter← 0
3: while NoImprovementCounter ≤ Limit do
4: improvementFlaд← f alse
5: C1← Random(CS) s.t. C1>MinSize
6: C2← Random(CS) s.t. C2<MaxSize
7: for a ∈ C1 do
8: currCS ← CS \ {C1,C2} ∪ {C1 \ {a},C2 ∪ {a}}
9: if lex(currCS) > lex(bestCS) then
10: bestCS ← currcS
11: improvementFlaд← true
12: end if
13: end for
14: if improvementFlaд then
15: NoImprovementCounter ← 0
16: else
17: NoImprovementCounter + +
18: end if
19: end while
20: return bestCS
5.2 Results
For the experiments we used real data from three schools
as well as randomly generated graphs. In our experiments
we checked both unweighted and weighted graphs using
Borda-like weights for the preferences of the students,
where a student’s most preferred friend gets a weight ofm
wherem is the number of friends allowed to be chosen, the
next most preferred getsm − 1 and so on. Here we focus
on few of the results while there are more in the appendix
showing the same tendency between algorithms.
Data from one school consisted of 127 students with 3
friends each. After running all of the algorithms on the
graph as unweighted, we obtained the results shown in
Table 1. As can be seen in the table, there’s a big dierence
between the average degree obtained by KaHIP and by
simply running Simulated Annealing or Leximin. As such,
we tried running the Simulated Annealing and Leximin
from dierent partitions obtained by KaHIP and got much
better results. We can see that for the price of only one
friendship (320 compared to 319) we can change the par-
tition to ensure that every student gets at least one of her
friends, which is a crucial dierence. The large dierence
in performance between running Simulated Annealing and
Leximin from randomly generated partitions and from ones
resulted by KaHIP was consistent through all experiments.
This can be seen more clearly in Table 2 and Figure 1. In
Table 2 we see the results of a second school which consists
of 146 students. Each can rank up to ve friends, with each
friend’s weight matching the friend’s ranking. In Figure 1
we see the results on synthetically generated graphs with
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Min Deg Avg Deg Total Deg Gini
KaHIP 0 2.52 320 0.113
SA 1 1.65 210 0.133
SA_KH 1 2.38 303 0.095
Lex 1 1.85 235 0.105
Lex_KH 1 2.51 319 0.096
Table 1: School 1 Results
Min Weight Avg Weight Total Weight Gini
KaHIP 0 11.50 1679 0.084
SA 2 5.0 730 0.101
SA_KH 4 10.67 1558 0.089
Lex 1 7.26 1060 0.100
Lex_KH 4 11.27 1630 0.076
Table 2: School 2 Results
the same settings; a weighted graph where each node has
ve neighbours, uniformly generated. Each column rep-
resents the average of 100 random graphs, all of the same
size matching the column. We see that as the graph is small
the Simulated Annealing slightly outperforms the Leximin
when it comes to the minimum weight, but the larger it is
the worse it gets, while the Leximin is consistent. When
it comes to the average weight KaHIP always dominates
the other algorithms as expected, but the Leximin from
KaHIP isn’t so far behind, while it obviously by far out-
performs the KaHIP’s minimum weight performance. The
surprising result is that by starting with KaHIP, the other
algorithms not only improve their utilitarian value, but also
their egalitarian value, as remarkably seen in Table 2.
As a measure of fairness we use the Gini Coecient, a mea-
sure of statistical dispersion which in most cases represents
the measurement of inequality when distributing wealth
among agents. For our problem we can use it to estimate
how fair a certain coalition structure is: the lower the Gini
Coecient, the more egalitarian and fair a distribution
is. We see that Leximin consistently provides a low Gini
Coecient and as such results in fair coalition structures
with minimal dierences between students. It so happens
that Leximin almost constantly results in the lowest Gini
Coecient when initiated with a KaHIP partition. We also
see that when the Simulated Annealing performs very well
it has a lower Gini than the Leximin, as we see in the case
of graphs of size 40. On the contrary, when it performs
poorly it also results in unfair coalitions, even worse than
KaHIP, as we see in the case of graphs of size 140 or 160.
6 Conclusion
We analyzed the problem of coalition formation where a
xed number of equally sized coalitions must be formed
with the goal of maximizing the egalitarian social welfare.
We showed that the problem cannot be done in polyno-
mial time, even when only 2 coalitions must be formed.
We provided a polynomial time algorithm in the case of a
xed k and checking for an egalitarian value of at least 1,
Figure 1: Performance of algorithms over graphs of dier-
ent sizes. (a) Minimum Weight (b) Average Weight (c) Gini
Coecient
and a similar result for an egalitarian value of at least 2 in
the case of symmetric games. With respect to the utilitar-
ian social welfare we provided some heuristics that try to
maximize it as a secondary goal to the egalitarian social
welfare. We showed that a bound between the utilitarian
social welfare of the maximum egalitarian social welfare
coalition structure and the maximum utilitarian possible
does not exist, except for the trivial one. We then showed
the performance of three algorithms on real data and syn-
thetic data. KaHIP had the best results with respect to the
utilitarian value, as expected, but it ignored the egalitarian
value. Simulated Annealing and Leximin had better results
on the egalitarian value, and when initiated with partitions
generated by KaHIP had even better ones, resulting in a
minor loss to the utilitarian value and a signicant gain
to the egalitarian value. Identifying a family of graphs on
which the problems stated above are tractable or bounded
by some factors is the subject of further research.
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7
A Charts of graphs
In the appendix we show only the results of Simulated Annealing
and Leximin initiated with partitions from KaHIP, as the ones initi-
ated from random partitions are simply sub performing variations
of these.
(a) Minimum Weight
(b) Average Weight
(c) Gini Coecient
Figure 2: Performance of algorithms over weighted graphs
of size 100, out degree 5, with dierent number of partitions
Min Weight Avg Weight Total Weight Gini
KaHIP 4 12.09 1318 0.070
SA_KH 6 11.74 1280 0.074
Lex_KH 6 12.01 1310 0.067
Table 3: School 3 Results. 109 Students, 5 friends each,
partition to 5 classes.
(a) Minimum Degree
(b) Average Degree
(c) Gini Coecient
Figure 3: Performance of algorithms over unweighted
graphs of size 100, out degree 7, over dierent number
of partitions
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